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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
v. 
DAVID CARL REED, : Case No. 20050670-CA 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
INTRODUCTION 
This Court should reverse Reed's conviction for attempted child kidnapping 
because the evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to the jury's verdict, was 
insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he made a substantial step toward the 
commission of child kidnapping. 
ARGUMENT 
THIS COURT SHOULD REVERSE BECAUSE THE EVIDENCE WAS 
INSUFFICIENT TO PROVE BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT THAT REED 
WAS GUILTY OF ATTEMPTED CHILD KIDNAPPING 
As explained in Reed's opening brief, in order to prove beyond a reasonable doubt 
that he "engage[d] in conduct constituting a substantial step toward commission o f child 
kidnapping, the State had to show his conduct "strongly corroborate)^]" either his 
"conscious objective or desire" to seize, confine, detain, or transport Ashley Poike 
(Poike) without authority of law or the consent of her parents, or that he acted "with an 
awareness that his conduct [was] reasonably certain" to result in seizing, confining, 
detaining, or transporting Poike without authority of law or the consent of her parents. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-103(l)-(2) (2003); Utah Code Ann. § 76-4-101(l)(b) (Supp. 
2005); Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-301.1(1) (2003); see Aplt. Br. at 19-20. The marshaled 
evidence, however, was "so 'inconclusive or inherently improbable that reasonable minds 
must have entertained a reasonable doubt'" that Reed's conduct constituted a substantial 
step toward child kidnapping. State v. Gonzales, 2000 UT App 136,TJ10, 2 P.3d 954 
(citations omitted); see Aplt. Br. at 13-17 (marshaled evidence). 
Assuming Reed opened the car door and said "Get in," as Poike claimed, the fatal 
flaw in the evidence is that he did so from half a city block away. Reed did not stop "a 
bit ahead o f Poike. See Rspt. Br. at 11. He stopped half a city block away from her at a 
stop sign. R. 226:26-28, 36-38, 77, 81-83; State's Exhibit 7. As poignantly demonstrated 
by State's Exhibit 7, the idea that, from that distance, Reed acted with a "conscious 
objective or desire" to kidnap Poike or "with an awareness that his conduct was 
reasonably certain" to result in kidnapping Poike is so inherently improbable that 
reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-
103(l)-(2); Utah Code Ann. § 76-4-10l(l)(b); Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-301.1(1); R. 
State's Exhibit 7. 
As explained in his opening brief, Reed had plenty of opportunity to try to kidnap 
Poike, if that was his intent. Aplt. Br. at 21-22. He was directly across the street from 
her the first time he stopped and, following his U-turn, he drove right past her. R. 
226:24-26, 33, 36, 77, 81-82. But he did not induce her to get into the car from either of 
2 
these vantage points. Id. Instead, he waited until he was half a city block away and 
stopped at a stop sign. R. 226:26-28, 36-38, 77, 81-83; State's Exhibit 7. To have 
committed child kidnapping from that position, Reed would have had to, at the very least, 
get out of the car, display some kind offeree or weapon, or otherwise threaten or chase 
Poike. See State v. Johnson, 821 P.2d 1150, 1157 (Utah 1991) (holding evidence 
insufficient to establish substantial step toward first degree murder where it showed 
defendant purchased counterfeit crank but did not show she attempted to administer it to 
her husband). Anything less would not have represented a substantial step because it 
could not reasonably have been expected to induce a 12-year old girl to abandon her 
plans and her "pretty big" dog; run half a city block past six houses, at least one of which 
belonged to a friend of hers; and get into a stranger's vehicle without crying out or 
otherwise drawing attention to herself. R. 226:26, 29-30, 36, 41, 44, 48, 77, 81-83; 
State's Exhibit 7. Thus, Reed's simple act of opening the car door and saying "Get in," 
did not constitute a substantial step toward the commission of child kidnapping. See id. 
Further, even assuming "lying in wait, searching for or following" a person 
constitutes a substantial step as defined by Utah's attempt statute, the jury made no 
finding that Reed lay in wait, searched for, or followed Poike. See Rspt. Br. at 10 
(quoting Model Penal Code §5.01(2) (2002)). The State did not argue Reed was guilty of 
attempted child kidnapping because he lay in wait, searched for, or followed Poike; 
rather, it argued Reed was guilty of attempted child kidnapping because he opened the 
car door from half a city block away and told Poike to get in. R. 227:43 (prosecutor 
noting "key point" is "the part about opening the car door and telling [Poike] to get in"), 
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45-47 (prosecutor arguing Poike's statement that Reed opened car door and said "Get in" 
satisfied elements of attempted child kidnapping). Accordingly, the jury did not consider 
whether Reed lay in wait, searched for, or followed Poike. Id. Instead, it decided only 
whether Reed opened the door and said "Get in" and, if so, whether such actions 
constituted a substantial step toward child kidnapping. R. 227:50-51 (defense counsel 
explaining "case boils down to" whether jury was "convinced beyond a reasonable doubt 
. . . that [Reed] opened the car door and told [Poike] to get in," and those actions were 
"substantial step towards accomplishing the goal of kidnapping a child"). Thus, the 
question before this Court is not whether there was sufficient evidence to show Reed lay 
in wait, searched for, or followed Poike, but whether there was sufficient evidence to 
support the jury's finding that Reed's act of opening the car door and saying "Get in" 
constituted a substantial step toward the commission of child kidnapping. 
Thus, this Court should reverse because there was insufficient evidence to support 
his conviction for attempted child kidnapping. Instead, as explained in Reed's opening 
brief, this Court should enter a conviction for attempted lewdness involving a child, a 
class B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-9-702.5 (2003) and Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-4-101. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402(5) (2003). 
CONCLUSION 
Reed respectfully requests this Court to reverse his conviction for attempted child 
kidnapping, and to enter a judgment of conviction for the lesser-included offense of 
attempted lewdness involving a child. 
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SUBMITTED this 2 3 ^ a y of March, 2006. 
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